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Abstract 
Shamir proposed the concept of the ID-based Encryption (IBE) in [1]. Instead of generating and 
publishing a public key for each user, the ID-based scheme permits each user to choose his name or 
network address as his public key. This is advantageous to public-key cryptosystems because the public-
key verification is so easy and direct. In such a way, a large public key file is not required. Since new 
cryptographic schemes always face security challenges and many integer factorization anddiscrete 
logarithm based cryptographic systems have been deployed, therefore, the purpose of this paper is to 
design a transformation process that can transfer the entire discrete logarithm and integer factorization 
based cryptosystems into the ID-based systems rather than re-invent a new system. We consider the 
security against a conspiracy of some entities in the proposed system and show the possibility of 
establishing a more secure system. 
  
Keywords: Public key Cryptosystem (PKC), ID-based Encryption (IBE), Discrete Logarithm (DL) and 
Integer Factorization (IF) 
  
 
1. Introduction 
In 1984, Shamir [1] introduced the concept of an identity-based cryptography. In this 
system, each user needs to visit key authentication center (KAC) and identify himself before 
joining the network. Once a user's identity is accepted, the KAC will provide him with a secret 
key. In this way, a user needs only to know the “identity” of his communication partner and the 
public key of the KAC, together with his secret key, to communicate with others. There is no 
public file required in this system. However, Shamir did not succeed in constructing an ID-based 
cryptosystem, but only in constructing an ID-based signature scheme. Since then, much 
research has been devoted, especially in Japan, to various kinds of ID-based cryptographic 
schemes. Okamoto et al. [2] proposed an identity-based key distribution system in 1988, and 
later, Ohta [3] extended their scheme for user identification. These schemes use the RSA public 
key cryptosystem [4] for operations in modular N, where N is a product of two large primes, and 
the security of these schemes is based on the computational difficulty of factoring this large 
composite number N. Tsujii and Itoh [5] have also proposed an ID-based cryptosystem based 
on the discrete logarithm problem with single discrete exponent which uses the ElGamal public 
key cryptosystem.  
In 1991, Maurer and Yacobi [6] developed a non-interactive ID-based public-key 
distribution system. In their scheme, the public keys are self-authenticated and require no 
further authentication by certificates. However, some problems with this scheme were found, the 
scheme was modified and the final version was presented [7]. In 1998, Tseng and Jan [8] 
improved the scheme proposed by Maurer and Yacobi, and provided a non-interactive ID-based 
public-key distribution system with multi-objectives such as an ID-based signature scheme, an 
identification scheme, and a conference key distribution system. In their scheme, the 
computational complexity of the system is heavy. Therefore, it is necessary to have a powerful 
computational capability. Harn [9] proposed public key cryptosystem design based on factoring 
and discrete logarithm whose security is based factoring and discrete logarithm. In 2001, 
Bonehet. al [10] used a variant of integer factorization problem to construct his ID-based 
encryption scheme. However, the scheme is inefficient in that a plain-text message is encrypted 
bit-by-bit and hence the length of the output ciphertext becomes long. 
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In 2004, Lee & Liao [11] design a transformation process that can transfer all of the 
discrete logarithm based cryptosystems into the ID-based systems rather than reinvent a new 
system .After 2004 several ID-based cryptosystems [12, 13, 14, 15,16,17,18,19, 20, 21, 22, 
23,24, 25, 26, 27] have been proposed. But in these schemes, the public key of each entity is 
not only an identity, but also some random number selected either by the entity or by the trusted 
authority. In 2009 Bellare et al. [28] provides security proof or attacks for a large number of ID-
based identification and signature schemes. Underlying these is a framework that on the one 
hand helps explain how these schemes are derived and on the other hand enables modular 
security analyses, thereby helping to understand, simplify, and unify previous work. Based on 
the observation that new cryptographic schemes always face security challenges and 
confidentiality concerns and many integer factorization & discrete logarithm-based cryptographic 
systems have been deployed. The major contribution of our scheme is the key generation 
phase, which is just a simple transformation process with low computational complexity. No 
modification of the original design of the discrete logarithm and integer factorization based 
cryptosystems is necessary. Therefore, the new scheme has the same security as the original 
one, and retains all of the advantages of the ID-based system. 
As outlined in the above, unfortunately we found that the entire existing IBE scheme 
based on discrete logarithm and integer factorization cannot be regarded as secure. Therefore, 
we design IBE for discrete logarithm  with distinct discrete exponent and integer factorization 
(the basic idea of the proposed system comes on the public key cryptosystem based on discrete 
logarithm  and integer factorization) because we face the problem of solving integer factorization 
and distinct discrete logarithm simultaneously in the multiplicative group of finite fields as 
compared to the other public key cryptosystem, where we face the difficulty of solving 
simultaneously the integer factoring and discrete logarithm in the common group. Here we 
describe further considerations such as the security of the system, the identification for senders. 
etc. our scheme does not  require any interactive preliminary communications in each message 
transmission and any assumption except the intractability of the discrete logarithm and integer 
factorization.(this assumption seems to be quite reasonable) Thus the proposed scheme is a 
concrete example of an ID–based cryptosystem which satisfies Shamir’s original conept [1] in a 
strict sense. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2, presented proposed 
PKC based on disecrete logarithm and integer factorization. Section 3, explains consistency of 
the algorithm. Section 4, describes implementation of the IBE.Section 5 describes protocol of 
the proposed IBE. Section 6, discussed security analysis and discussion of the IBE. Section 7, 
discussed enhancement of security and processing cost. Conclusion is given in the final 
section8. 
 
 
2. PKC based on DL and IF 
In this section, we introduce some notation and parameters, which will be used 
throughout this paper: Two large prime numbers ݌ and ݍ are safe primes and set ܰ ൌ ݌ݍ ,one 
may use methodin [29] to generate strong random primes. A function ߮ሺܰሻ ൌ ሺ݌ െ 1ሻሺݍ െ 1ሻ is a 
phi–Euler function and an integer	݃  is primitive element in ܼே∗ with order ݊ such that 		݃௡ିଵ ≡1	ሺ݉݋݀ܰሻ .  
The algorithm consists of three subalgorithm, key generation, encryption and decryption  
 
Key generation: The key generation algorithm runs as follows (entity 1 should do the following) 
1. Pick random an integer݁ ൏ ܰfrom ܼఝሺேሻ∗  such that ݃ܿ݀ሺ݁, ܰሻ ൌ 1. 
2. Select a random integerݔ ൏ ܰ and Compute  ݕ ൌ ݃௫ሺ݉݋݀ܰሻ . 
3. Use the extended Euclidean algorithm to compute the unique integer݀,	1 ൑ ݀ ൑ ߮ሺܰሻ such 
that݁݀ ≡ 1	ሺ݉݋݀߮ሺܰሻሻ. 
The public key is formed by ሺܰ, ݁, ݕሻ	and the corresponding private key is given by ሺ݀, ݔሻ. 
 
Encryption: A entity 2 to encrypt a message ܯ to entity 1 should do the following: 
1. Obtain public key ሺܰ, ݁, ݕሻ. 
2. Represent the message as ܯ ∈ ሾ1,ܰሿ. 
3. Select a random integer	ݔ ൏ ܰ. 
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4. Compute ܥଵ ൌ ݃௥ሺ݉݋݀ܰሻ andܥଶ ൌ ሺܯݕି௥ሻ௘ሺ݉݋݀ܰሻ. 
The cipher text is given by ܥ ൌ ሺܥଵ, ܥଶሻ 
 
Decryption: To recover the plaintext ܯ from the cipher textܥ, entity does the following: 
1. Compute ܥଵ௫ܥଶௗ ≡ ܯሺ݉݋݀ܰሻ 
2. Recover the plaintext M. 
 
 
3. Consistency of the Algorithm  
ܥଵ௫ܥଶௗ ≡ ሾሺܯݕି௥ሻ௘ሿௗሺ݃௥ሻ௫ሺ݉݋݀ܰሻ ≡ ሺܯݕି௥ሻ݃௥௫ሺ݉݋݀ܰሻ 
≡ ሺܯ݃ି௥௫ሻ݃௥௫ሺ݉݋݀ܰሻ 
≡ ܯሺ݉݋݀ܰሻ 
 
 
4. Implementation of the IBE 
 
4.1 Preparation for the center and each entity 
 
Step 1.  Each entity generates a k-dimensional binary vector for his ID. We denote entity ݅’ݏ ID 
by ID௜ as follows: 
 
ID௜ ൌ ሺݔ௜ଵ,ݔ௜ଶ, ݔ௜ଷ, ݔ௜ସ, ……… . , ݔ௜௞ሻ	, ݔ௜௝ ∈ ሼ0,1ሽ	, ሺ1 ൑ ݆ ൑ ݇ሻ    (1) 
 
Each entity registers his ID with the center, and the center stores it in a public file. 
 
Step 2.: The center generates two random prime numbers ݌ and ݍ ,compute 
 
ܰ ൌ ݌ݍ          (2)  
 
Then the center chooses an arbitrary random number  ,	1 ൑ ݁ ൑ ߮ሺܰሻ such that gcd൫݁, ߮ሺܰሻ൯ ൌ
1	where ߮ሺܰሻ ൌ ሺ݌ െ 1ሻሺݍ െ 1ሻ is the Euler function of ܰ, then the center publishesሺ݁, ܰሻ as the 
public key. Any entity can compute the entity i’s extended  ID, EID௜by the following: 
 
EID௜ ൌ ሺID௜ሻ௘ሺ݉݋݀	ܰሻ 
=ሺݕ௜ଵ,ݕ௜ଶ, ݕ௜ଷ, ݕ௜ସ, ……… . , ݕ௜௧ሻ	, ݕ௜௝ ∈ ሼ0,1ሽ	, ሺ1 ൑ ݆ ൑ ݐሻ    (3) 
 
where ݐ ൌ |ܰ| is the number of bits of ܰ. 
 
Step 3. Center‘s secrete information: The center chooses an arbitrary large prime ݌ and ݍ  
computes ܰ ൌ ݌ݍ and also generate n-dimensional vector Ԧܽ over  ܼఝሺேሻ∗  which satisfies  
 
Ԧܽ ൌ ሺܽଵ, ܽଶ, ܽଷ, …… , ܽ௡ሻ         (4)  
 
1 ൑ ܽ௜ ൑ ߮ሺܰሻ, ሺ1 ൑ ݅ ൑ ݊ሻ 
ܽܫ ് ܽܬ൫݉݋݀߮ሺܰሻ൯		, ܫ ് ܬ        (5) 
  
where ܫ and ܬ	are n-dimensional binary vector and stores it as the centers secret information. 
The condition of equation (5) is necessary to avoid the accidental coincidence of some entities 
secrete keys. A simple way to generate the vector Ԧܽ is to use the Merkle and Hellman  
scheme [30]. 
The center chooses a super-increasing sequences corresponding to ܽ as ܽ௜ᇱሺ1 ൑ ݅ ൑ ݊ሻ satisfies  ∑ ܽ௜ᇱଵஸ௜ஸ௡ ൏ ߮ሺܰሻ (6)                                                                    
 
Step 4: The center also chooses ݓ such that gcdሺݓ, ߮ሺܰሻሻ ൌ 1, and computes n-dimensional 
vector Ԧܽ as follows 
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ܽ௜ ൌ ܽ௜ᇱݓሺ݉݋݀߮ሺܰሻሻሺ1 ൑ ݅ ൑ ݊ሻ,       (7) 
  
where 
 
Ԧܽ ൌ ሺܽଵ, ܽଶ, ܽଷ, … , ܽ௡ሻ,        (8)  
 
Remark 1: It is clear that the vector Ԧܽ defined by Eq. (8) satisfies the Eqs. (4)-(5) the above 
scheme is one method of generating ݊ vectors Ԧܽ  satisfies Eqs. (4)-(5). However, another 
method might be possible. 
 
Step 5: The center also chooses a unique integer	݀, ሺ1 ൑ ݀ ൑ ߮ሺܰሻሻ such that 
 
݁݀ ≡ 1	ሺ݉݋݀߮ሺܰሻሻ        (9) 
 
Step 6: Center public information: The center chooses an arbitrary generator ݃ of  ܼఝሺேሻ∗  and 
computes n-dimensional vector ݄ using generator ݃ corresponding to the vector. 
 
݄ ൌ ሺ݄ଵ, ݄ଶ, ݄ଷ, …… , ݄௡ሻ,        (10) 
 
݄௜ ൌ ݃௔೔݉݋݀ܰሺ1 ൑ ݅ ൑ ݊ሻ,       (11)  
 
The center informs each entity ሺܰ, ݁, ݃, ݄ሻ as public information. 
 
Step 7: Each entity secrete key: Entity ݅′ݏ secrete keysݏ௜is computed by inner product of 	ܽ 
(the centre’s secret information) and EID௜ (entity ݅′ݏ extended ID, see Eq.3) 
 
ݏ௜ ൌ ܽ	EID௜ሺ݉݋݀߮ሺܰሻሻ 
    =∑ ௝ܽݕ௜௝ଵஸ௝ஸ௡ ݉݋݀	ሺ߮ሺܰሻሻ       (12) 
  
 
5. Protocol of the proposed IBE 
Without loss of generality, we suppose that entity 2 sends message  ܯ to entity 1. 
 
5.1   Encryption  
Entity 2 generatesEIDଵ (entity 1′ݏ extended ID, see Eq.3) from	IDଵ. It then computes ߛଵ 
from corresponding public information ݄ and EIDଵ : 
 
ߛଵ ൌ ෑ ݄௜௬భ೔ሺ݉݋݀ܰሻ
ଵஸ௜ஸ௡
 
ൌ ෑ ሺ݃௔೔ሻ௬భ೔ሺ݉݋݀ܰሻ
ଵஸ௜ஸ௡
 
ൌ ݃∑ ௔೔௬భ೔భರ೔ರ೙ ௠௢ௗ൫ఝሺேሻ൯ሺ݉݋݀ܰሻ 
	ൌ ݃
௦భሺ݉݋݀ܰሻ	         (13)  
 
Entity 2 will use ߛଵ in our propose scheme. Let ܯሺ1 ൑ ܯ ൑ ܰሻ be a message to be transmitted. 
Entity 2 is select a random integer ݎ ൏ ܰ and computes the cipher text ܥ as follows  
 
ܥ ൌ ሺܥଵ, ܥଶሻ ܥଵ ≡ ݃௥ሺ݉݋݀ܰሻ         (14) 
 
ܥଶ ≡ ሺܯݕି௥ሻ௘ሺ݉݋݀ܰሻ        (15) 
 
 The cipher text is given by  ܥ ൌ ሺܥଵ, ܥଶሻ 
 
 
                     ISSN: 2089-3191 
Bulletin of EEI Vol. 4, No. 2, June 2015 :  160 – 168 
164
5.2   Decryption   
To recover the plaintext  ܯ from the cipher text  
Entity 1 does the following:  
Computes     ܥଵ௦ೌሺ݉݋݀ܰሻ ≡ ሺ݃௥ሻ௦ೌ	ሺ݉݋݀ܰሻ(16)                                                                                                             
Using his secrete key  ݏଵ, recovered entity 2’s the message M by Eqs. (13) and (16) to 
computes 
 
 
 
൫ܥଵ௦భܥଶௗ൯ ≡ ݃௥௦భሾሺܯݕି௥ሻ௘ሿௗሺ݉݋݀ܰሻ 
≡ ሺܯݕି௥ሻ݃௥௦భሺ݉݋݀ܰሻ 
≡ ሺܯ݃ି௥௦భሻ݃௥௦భሺ݉݋݀ܰሻ 
≡ ܯሺ݉݋݀ܰሻ 
 
6. Security Analysis  and Discussion  
In this section, we shall show six possible attacks by which an attacker may try to take 
down the new encryption scheme. For each attack, we define the attack and give reason why 
this attack could be failed.   
The security of ID-based cryptosystem based on the index problem in the multiplicative 
cyclic group	ܼఝሺேሻ∗ , where ܰ ൌ ݌ݍ (The factorization of Nis known only to the center.) where 
߮ሺܰሻ Euler function of ܰ. In this system Coppersmith showed an attacking method [31] such 
that ሺ݊ ൅ 1ሻ entities conspiracy can derive the center's secret information. 
 
Attack 1 [31]: The ሺ݊ ൅ 1ሻ entities ݅	, ሺ1 ൑ ݅ ൑ ݊ ൅ 1ሻ can derive an n-dimensional vector a' over 
	ܼఝሺேሻ∗  which is equivalent (not necessarily identical) to the original center's secret information. 
Proof: When  ሺ݊ ൅ 1ሻ entities' ݅	, ሺ1 ൑ ݅ ൑ ݊ ൅ 1ሻ conspire, they have the following system of 
linear congruences: 
 
ۏ
ێێ
ێ
ۍ ܧܫܦଵܧܫܦଶܧܫܦଷ⋮
ܧܫܦ௡ାଵے
ۑۑ
ۑ
ې
ۏێ
ێێ
ۍܽଵܽଶܽଷ⋮
ܽ௡ے
ۑۑ
ۑې ൌ
ۏێ
ێێ
ۍ ݏଵݏଶݏଷ⋮
ݏ௡ାଵے
ۑۑ
ۑې	ሺ݉݋݀	߮ሺܰሻሻ      (17) 
 
Since each EID௜ is an n-dimensional binary vector, there exists an ሺ݊ ൅ 1ሻ-dimensional vector ܿover the integer ring such that 
 
෍ ܿ௜ܧܫܦ௜
ଵஸ௜ஸ௡ାଵ
ൌ 0 (18) 
 
Thus we have  
 
෍ ܿ௜ݏ௜
ଵஸ௜ஸ௡ାଵ
ൌ 0ሺ݉݋݀	߮ሺܰሻሻ (19) 
 
And then  
 
෍ ܿ௜ݏ௜
ଵஸ௜ஸ௡ାଵ
ൌ ܣ	߮ሺܰሻ (20) 
 
If ܣ ് 0, the ሺ݊ ൅ 1ሻ entities can have an integer multiple of		߮ሺܰሻ , and they can find out the 
factorization of		ܰ.Then, a similar method with attack 1 is applicable. Hence, the center's secret 
information can be derived by ሺ݊ ൅ 1ሻ entities conspiracy. 
Furthermore, Shamir developed a more general attacking method [32] for the modified 
system such that ሺ݊ ൅ 2ሻ entities conspiracy can derive the center's secret information with high 
probability. 
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Attack 2 [32]: The ሺ݊ ൅ 2ሻ entities ݅	, ሺ1 ൑ ݅ ൑ ݊ ൅ 2ሻ can derive the center's secret information ܽ 
with high probability. 
Proof: When  ሺ݊ ൅ 1ሻ entities  ݅	, ሺ1 ൑ ݅ ൑ ݊ ൅ 1ሻ conspire, they have the following system of 
linear congruence’s defied by Eq. (21) 
 
ۏ
ێێ
ێ
ۍ ܧܫܦଵܧܫܦଶܧܫܦଷ⋮
ܧܫܦ௡ାଵے
ۑۑ
ۑ
ې
ۏێ
ێێ
ۍܽଵܽଶܽଷ⋮
ܽ௡ے
ۑۑ
ۑې ൌ
ۏێ
ێێ
ۍ ݏଵݏଶݏଷ⋮
ݏ௡ାଵے
ۑۑ
ۑې	ሺ݉݋݀	߮ሺܰሻሻ      (21) 
=ܦܽሺ݉݋݀	߮ሺܰሻሻ        (22) 
 
Assuming that the matrix ܦincludes n linearly independent column vectors over the integer ring, 
there exist some positive integers ܿ௜ሺ1 ൑ ݅ ൑ ݊ ൅ 1ሻsuch that 
 
ۏ
ێێ
ێ
ۍ ܧܫܦଵܧܫܦଶܧܫܦଷ⋮
ܧܫܦ௡ାଵے
ۑۑ
ۑ
ې
ۏێ
ێێ
ۍ ܽଵܽଶܽଷ⋮
ܽ௡ାଵے
ۑۑ
ۑې ൌ
ۏێ
ێێ
ۍ ݏଵݏଶݏଷ⋮
ݏ௡ାଵے
ۑۑ
ۑې െ
ۏێ
ێێ
ۍ ܿଵܿଶܿଷ⋮
ܿ௡ାଵے
ۑۑ
ۑې ߮ሺܰሻ      (23) 
 
Thus, Eq. (23) can be rewritten by the following: 
 
ۏ
ێێ
ێ
ۍ ܧܫܦଵܧܫܦଶܧܫܦଷ⋮
ܧܫܦ௡ାଵے
ۑۑ
ۑ
ې
ۏ
ێێ
ێ
ۍ ܽଵܽଶܽଷ⋮ܽ
௡െ1ے
ۑۑ
ۑ
ې
ൌ െ
ۏێ
ێێ
ۍ ܿଵܿଶܿଷ⋮
ܿ௡ାଵے
ۑۑ
ۑې ߮ሺܰሻ       (24) 
 
= ܦᇱܽᇱ          (25) 
 
From the assumption that the matrix ܦin Eq. (22) includes n linearly independent column 
vectors over the integer ring, it follows that the matrix ܦ′is nonsingular over the integer ring (i.e., 
detሺܦ′ሻ ് 0ሻwith overwhelming probability, and thus, we have ܽ′ ് ሺ݉݋݀߮ሺܰሻሻ.On the other 
hand, we have the following system of linear congruence’s: 
 
ܦ′ܽ′ ൌ 0ሺ݉݋݀߮ሺܰሻሻ        (26) 
 
If the matrix ܦᇱ is nonsingular over ܼఝሺேሻ∗ , then  ܽᇱ ൌ ሺ݉݋݀	߮ሺܰሻሻ , and this contradicts 
the above results. Thus, the matrix ܦᇱis singular over	ܼఝሺேሻ∗ , and we have det ሺܦᇱሻ ൌ
0ሺ݉݋݀	߮ሺܰሻሻ with high probability. Hence, det ሺܦ′ሻ is divisible by ߮ሺܰሻ with high probability. 
Furthermore, consider the case where the other ሺ݊ ൅ 1ሻ entities among ሺ݊ ൅ 2ሻ conspire, and 
define the matrix ܦᇱᇱin a way similar to the above. Then, detሺܦᇱᇱሻ is divisible by ߮ሺܰሻwith high 
probability. Hence, GCD (detሺ	ܦᇱሻ, detሺܦᇱᇱሻ) gives ݁߮ሺܰሻ where e is a small positive integer. By 
the above procedure, we can evaluate	߮ሺܰሻ efficiently. An additional procedure to find the 
center's secret information is completely the same as attack 1. 
 
Attack 3: Anattacker wishes to obtain all secrete keys using all information available from the 
system. In this case, attacker needs to solve integer factorization problem and discrete 
logarithm problem simultaneously. The best way to factorize ܰ ൌ ݌ݍ is by using the number field 
sieve method (NFS) [33]. But this method is just dependent on the size of modulusܰ.It is 
computationally infeasible to factor a 1024-bit integer and to increase the security of our 
scheme; we should select strong primes [4] to avid attacks using special purpose factorization 
algorithms. To maintain the same security level for discrete logarithm problem with double 
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distinct discrete exponent, one must uses ܰ ൌ ݌ݍ with ቀ௣ିଵଶ ቁ and ቀ
௤ିଵ
ଶ ቁ  respectively is product 
of two 512-bit primes. 
 
Attack 4: Assume that the attacker successfully solves the factoring problem so that he knows 
secrete key	݀.Thus he may obtainܥଶௗ ≡ ሺܯݕି௥ሻ௘ௗሺ݉݋݀ܰሻ ≡ ܯ݃ି௥௦భሺ݉݋݀ܰሻ. Unfortunately, at 
this stage he still does not knows secrete ݏ௔ and cannot exactact the plaintext  ܯ from the 
above expression. 
Attack 5: An attacker is able to obtain the secrete integer ݏଵ from	ߛଵ ≡ ݃
௦భ
ሺ݉݋݀ܰሻ . He could 
derive the plaintext ܯ if and only if he manages to get ܯݕି௥,but this is impossible since he 
learns nothing about the integer	݀. 
 
Attack 6: An attacker might try to impersonate entity 	1  by developing some relation between ݓ 
and ݓ, since ߛଵൌ ܻ
௪௦భሺ݉݋݀ܰሻ and ߛଵ,ൌ ܻ
௪,௦భሺ݉݋݀ܰሻ  by knowing ߛଵ, ݓ,ݓ, the attacker can 
derive  ߛଵ,   as  ߛଵ,ൌ ߛଵ
௪షభ௪,
ሺ݉݋݀ܰሻ without knowing ݏ௜ however trying to obtain ݓ from ݃ is 
equivalent to compute the discrete logarithm problem. 
 
 
7. Enhancement of Security and Processing Cost 
The center's secret information for the original system in Section 4 is derived by n 
entities conspiracy. In this subsection, we consider the practical countermeasure for the 
enhancement of the security of the system. (For simplicity, assume that n = 512 throughout this 
subsection.) The center partitions a 512-dimensional binary vector Binto 256 segments, every 
two bits, such as 
 
B ൌ ሺbଵ, bଶ, bଷ, ……bହଵଵ, bହଵଶሻ ൌ ሺsegଵ, segଶ, segଷ, …… segହଵଵ, segହଵଶሻ      (27) 
 
Then, the center defines aሺi; jkሻሺ1 ൑ i ൑ 256; j, k ∈ ሼ0,1ሽሻ appropriately, computes hሺi; jkሻ, ሺ1 ൑
i≤256;j,k∈0,1, 
 
hሺi; jkሻ ൌ gୟሺ୧;୨୩ሻሺmodNሻ        (28) 
 
for each seg୧, and publishes the table including every hሺi; jkሻto all entities. Furthermore, the 
center computes each entity's secret key ݏ௞by 
 
	ݏ௞ ൌ ∑ ܽሺ݅;ଵஸ୧ஸଶହ଺ seg୩୧ሻሺ݉݋݀߮ሺܰሻሻ      (29) 
 
depending on Eq.(12).The entity k's extended identity, EID୩, where EID୩is partitioned into 256 
segments,every two bits such as ܧܫܦ௞ ൌ ሺseg୩ଵ, seg୩ଶ, seg୩ଷ, …… seg୩ଶହହ, seg୩ଶହ଺ሻthe center 
distributes it to each entity through a highlysecure channel. 
 
7.1 Encryption 
Entity 2 computes γଵᇱ  , 
 
ߛଵᇱ ൌ ∏ h൫i; seg1i൯1൑i൑256 	ሺmod	Nሻ      (30) 
 
from	EIDଵ and the published table. Entity 2 uses γଵ′ as γଵin the original system (in Section 4) to 
encrypt the message ܯ. 
 
7.2 Decryption  
This is exactly the same as in the original system in Section 4. In the original system in 
Section 4, the center's secret information is derived by 512 entities conspiracy, while in the 
above system it is derived by 1024 (= 4 x 256) entities conspiracy. Furthermore, the running 
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cost for encryption-key generation in the above system is about half of the original system. 
However, the center's public information in the above system is about twice than the original 
system. Further generalizations, e.g., each EID୧ is partitioned into 128 segments every four bits, 
etc., are possible.  
 
 
8. Conclusion  
In this present paper an ID-based cryptosystem for integer factorization problem and 
discrete logarithm problem in the multiplicative group of finite fields. The proposed scheme 
satisfies Shamir’s original concepts in a strict sense, i.e. it does not require any interactive 
preliminary communications in each data transmission and has no assumption that tamper free 
modules are available. This kind of scheme definitely provides a new scheme with a longer and 
higher level of security than the schemes that based on a factoring and discrete logarithm 
problem. The proposed scheme also requires minimal operations in encryption and decryption 
algorithms and thus makes it very efficient. Based on the fact that re-inventing a new scheme 
involves many uncertain and unknown threats, and integer factorization problem and discrete 
logarithm problem based schemes are widely deployed, our goal is to construct an ID-based 
transformation model for integer factorization problem and discrete logarithm problem based 
scheme rather than re-invent a new one. The concept of the ID-based system can be easily 
embedded into the entire integer factorization problem and discrete logarithm problem based 
cryptosystems without changing their original design. This solution can be directly deployed in 
the currently used system with very low cost. Therefore, our new scheme is more practical and 
has the same security as the original integer factorization problem and discrete logarithm 
problem based system. 
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